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 Abstract 
Just as medieval municipal republics surrendered to national sovereigns in the past, incumbent states 
may be replaced in the future by an alternate, global public order. Citizens and merchants would 
obtain more equal rights, better market infrastructures, and a more efficient provision of public goods 
at all levels of government, from the local to the global. This proposition is supported by an agent-
based, incentive-compatible model where individual rights—economic and political—are established 
within an ongoing bargain with rulers. Enfranchisement then shapes the autonomous dynamics of civil 
society and markets and, over time, allows for feedback of interests and preferences into the core 
bargain on rights. Hence dynamics of social change and economic growth are derived from the logic 
of delegation. Globalization results from a capacity to trade and associate that extends far beyond 
home jurisdictions, yet on the basis of differentiated, local or national franchises. Therefore, in this 
representation, the world is anarchic, pluralistic, unequal, and growing. Although it is not state-
centered, long-term change is driven by the attempts and failures of states and citizens to establish a 
more coherent normative infrastructure and to respond to new social demands. From this account, we 
derive four scenarios of global reordering, among which maximal integration would see the classical 
nation-state split into two parts: a decentralized, federal structure of government; and a unified legal 
order that would warrant equal rights and generalized open access throughout the world. 
 
 1. Introduction 
The literature on the emergence, growth, and possible decline of the “Westphalian order” exhibits two 
strongly opposed viewpoints.1 On the one hand, there is no lack of publications that explore the many 
ways in which states are losing their resources and legitimacy. Fiscal competition, forum shopping, 
and social dumping are common examples and often are cast as illustrations of how sovereignty is 
progressively drained or parceled out. For many authors, these trends foreshadow, or parallel, a crisis 
of political representation and the emergence of an increasingly vocal (though possibly ineffectual) 
international civil society. On the other hand, most specialists in international relations (IR) and in the 
theory of the state proclaim that states are here to stay. Whether realists or constructivists, historically 
minded or more attuned to public choice, in their view states will remain the highest level of political 
authority: states will continue to subsume street-corner society but without being subsumed by a more 
global order. In this view, sovereignty—rather than being fragmented and instrumental—is 
constitutive and so may never be fully relinquished. 
This article takes stock of the pluralistic environment in which states now operate, and on the basis of 
a constitutive definition of sovereignty it challenges the assumption that states cannot be voluntarily 
abolished or merged.  
Our argument is based on a concept of domestic sovereignty that is founded on a long-term, open-
ended bargain between citizens and their government: the commitment to abide by common rules and 
to pay taxes is negotiated against a set of enforceable individual rights—for example, physical and 
social security, property rights, or access to education. Sovereign delegation from citizens therefore 
constitutes a political order. If the covenant is tested and credible, then citizens may increase its size 
and benefit from a long-term extension of their capacity to exchange, invest, organize, and mobilize. 
And as their interests and preferences evolve with the division of labor, they may feed back 
dynamically into the bargain on sovereign delegation. 
Yet the delegation extends only within a bounded, domestic domain. This is where the franchise 
applies in its most comprehensive way, though not in an exclusive one. Citizens may still trespass a 
state’s borders, trade across them, exchange ideas, or even emigrate. Hence, individual franchises that 
are negotiated and established locally also support the extension of the international division of labor, 
but the latter may ultimately expose the spatial limits of the initial, local delegation. 
A classical example is how independent, medieval trading cities or French provinces were 
progressively abandoned in early modern times: merchants negotiated settlements with larger states 
that eventually endowed them with more rights, stronger enforcement guarantees, and better market 
infrastructures. Similarly, today’s domestic bargain between states and agents has endowed the latter 
with a unique capacity to leverage their rights across borders. They may now develop a business in 
Brazil, take a job in Japan, continue to vote in Spain, and support the Agha Khan foundation or a 
Mexican country school. A great many less enfranchised individuals also leave their provincial, often 
miserable villages (or slums) and try to relocate north of Rio Grande or the Strait of Gibraltar. These 
various trends indeed summarize a fair part of what “global governance” is about. 
Governments do much to support and regulate the new transnational behavior of individuals, thanks 
mostly to horizontal agreements and ad hoc mandates given to intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs); private rules and organizations also play a large part in international affairs, civic and 
economic. Still, the efficacy of these approaches is bounded, which is one reason why national 
governments are so often criticized by their own citizens for their failure to address adequately the 
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new demands for global rights and policies. Indeed, the present international order presents massive 
inequalities and is clearly inefficient in terms of policy making. Moreover, the erosion of states’ 
capabilities exacerbates the sense of a decline in the inherited domestic alignment between territorial 
states, liberal polities, and national economies. This situation suggests that future citizens and 
merchants may no longer be satisfied to either bargain with their national state or bypass them when 
their policy demands are not adequately satisfied. Over the long run, they may take a more radical turn 
and re-convey their core delegation to a supranational authority that would offer a preferred set of 
rights and public goods. 
Such a shift would trigger a major reordering of the world scene, both economic and political. The 
principles that define domestic sovereignty would be extended and unified across nations, so that basic 
individual rights would be established by a worldwide jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the task of providing 
public goods might be reassigned from the local to the global level, following social preferences, the 
cost of heterogeneity, and efficiency concerns. Thus, the defining pattern of this global order is that the 
state as a historically contingent figure would be split between a unified legal order and a 
decentralized (i.e., federal) government. However, we offer no determinist argument nor make a 
teleological claim; we only argue that there are practical, incentive-compatible roads that may lead to 
such result. 
This model also aims for maximum parsimony in describing political orders, how the social division 
of labor interacts with them, and how economic and civic interests are shaped. In particular, we do not 
discuss cultural or communitarian factors; rather, we consider them to be “written into” social (hence 
local) preferences and the basic rights negotiated with rulers. On the other hand, we do not address 
how external security threats may bear on domestic delegation and contribute thereby to the overall 
evolution of states.2 
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes how this contribution fits into the existing 
literature on states, globalization, and the evolution of the international order. Section 3 presents our 
agent-based, bottom-up analytical model, which describes how political orders (or states) are formed 
and how they may evolve and merge. Section 4 then identifies the principal forces serving to drive or 
hinder a global redistribution of sovereign contracts. Four global scenarios are examined in Section 5, 
the last of which includes full delegation without borders. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Related Literature 
Another way of introducing this article is to start from the prime influence on our notion of citizens’ 
delegation—namely, the classical contractual theory of the state as developed by Hobbes, Locke, and 
Rousseau. Beyond their many differences, these authors all defend the notion of a state that protects its 
citizens against war and aggression, as Realists are wont to recall. But in their view the state should 
also guarantee property rights and contracts, as New institutional economics point out. Then, the 
sovereign establishes the possibility of markets, entrepreneurship, and (following Locke) extended 
civil association.3 The state is concerned not only about government and the leveraging of executive 
powers but also about civil society and individual rights. Most contemporary perspectives still view 
sovereignty as embracing both political agency and the trusteeship of private rights and civil liberties. 
Our discussion will largely revolve around these two problematic dimensions of sovereignty and how 
they may extend internationally.  
The limitation of most “contractual” literature on sovereignty and state building is that it clings to the 
viewpoint of a closed society. Rather than proposing a clear view of how borders are negotiated, 
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constructed, and possibly displaced, this literature usually considers them as given and hence 
exogenous. At the other extreme, traditional IR theorists focus specifically on the relations between 
rather compact, self-contained, rational state actors. For such theorists, sovereignty is primarily an 
international concept based on force, mutual recognition, or rules. When challenged to offer a 
complementary concept of “domestic sovereignty”, they usually mention such principles as “final 
authority”, “legitimate violence”, or “the claim to self-government”.4 However, these notions are not 
definitions so much as outcomes (or expressions) of sovereignty. They also tend to be static and/or 
ahistorical, and they often suggest a rather discretionary—if not threatening—notion of government.5 
What is missing in this account is how the domestic “authority” and “legitimacy” are actually 
institutionalized, legitimized, and possibly renegotiated as well as how they affect the interaction 
between the domestic and the international. 
This same puzzle arise when one considers how economists envisage internationally similar, welfare-
maximizing micro-agents and then frame states primarily as an external source of transaction costs 
(via tariffs and nontariff barriers). Economists have developed various spatial concepts, but they 
typically have no interest in a self-standing concept of sovereignty or in the rights by which agents 
actually trade. Conversely, as they envisage how sovereign states interact, most IR theories, not only 
the realist school, rarely reference individual agency, economic or otherwise. At most they consider 
the collective interest of individual agents as expressed by, for example, ad hoc and presumably 
benevolent representative institutions.6 So both the economic and the IR approach have difficulty 
articulating the relation between individual behaviors and sovereignty. Either individuals dominate 
and sovereignty dissolves, or sovereignty dominates and individuals are indiscernible. This blind spot 
contrasts intriguingly with the common principle whereby liberal states (at the domestic level) 
guarantee private and civic rights. Should we conclude that agents become completely different social 
constructs upon exiting their home state? Or that they suddenly fall back into some state of nature?7 
This paper is built on the premise that a domestic concept of sovereignty—one based on a logic of 
delegation—should help us escape this dilemma. Thus, we consider how governments and citizens 
negotiate on rights and taxes at the domestic level before we envisage how they might then act and 
transact at the international level. In other words, the rights, resources, and capabilities of individuals 
and states are “carried over” from the domestic realm of delegation onto the international or global 
scene, which is therefore both plural and profoundly unequal. Even if all economic agents are rational 
and act intentionally, their endowments of rights and capabilities are de facto different; therefore, 
agents do not have the same capacity to valorize their resources on international markets. For example, 
Canadian and Bolivian merchants are not equal as they compete on international markets, neither are 
their respective governments as they try to further their interests in any given IGO. 
Our model, then, consistently accounts for private and civic action on the international scene while 
preserving a distinct anarchic pattern: the international domain is explicitly defined as not being 
regulated by any sovereign authority. The point is that anarchy is not observed exclusively in the 
relations among states. It is also present in the way agents behave and interact—whether domestically 
(among equals) or internationally (among unequals). 
These broad premises allow one to endorse the main theses of the Liberal school in IR. In this view, 
states exhibit domestically defined preferences stemming from the social division of labor; a state’s 
international actions reflect how it is established domestically;8 and private or civic agents may enter 
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the international scene and then feed back into the domestic polity. We agree to these propositions and 
add the parallel capacity of agents and rulers to act on their own, domestically and internationally, 
even as they are conjoined by their domestic bargain on rights and delegation.  
However, these propositions set us squarely against three broad, alternate approaches. First, we 
contradict the many authors9 who envisage sovereignty as a mere bundle of rights, capabilities, or 
discretionary options that may be ceded, on a case-by-case basis, for marginal cost–benefit 
considerations.10 Although most of the empirical evidence they rely upon is not in dispute, we can still 
argue for a concept of sovereignty that is constitutive of domestic political orders yet does not impose 
a state-centered representation of the global scene. Second, we often converge with Alesina and 
Spolaore in The Size of Nations (2003) as they discuss how the size of states is shaped by inter allia 
trade, economies of scale in the production of public goods, and social preferences. Yet they adopt the 
traditional economic perspective and view utility-maximizing agents as being naturally endowed with 
identical rights and franchises, which are thus completely independent of any political order or 
sovereign covenant. In fact we propose to endogenize individual franchises thanks to a more 
developed representation of the state, based on the logic of delegation.  
Third, we contradict the Constructivist paradigm. Alexander Wendt, for instance, confronts the 
Realists with an interactive view of the international scene and with a differentiated representation of 
individual states whose behaviors are shaped by their mutual interaction and by their desire for 
cultural or communitarian recognition.11 In fact, both this communitarian aspect and the internal 
aspects of state identity are given and static. For Constructivists, a state’s identity does not evolve 
from domestic dynamics and hardly allows for nonstate or individual agency. The same limitations 
apply to Wendt’s (2003) model of transition to a world state. Unlike Wendt, who makes the 
teleological assumption that change is driven by the tough interaction of states, we devise a model that 
is anarchic, agent-based, and open-ended. And whereas Wendt views domestic sovereignty as a 
structure of authority, we formalize it in terms of rights and enfranchisement. For us, then, 
sovereignty, states, and individual rights are social and historical constructs that can evolve and wane 
over the years depending on domestic and international circumstances; they are neither metaphysical 
concepts nor hypocrisies.12 
 
3. Analytical Model 
3.1. The Logic of Delegation 
We start from a straightforward, agent-based, institutionalist approach to describing political orders. 
Life in society entails coordination needs; in order to meet them, members may jointly delegate 
authority and resources to specialized agents, to trustees, or to governments. The potential benefits of 
such delegation allow agents to justify waiving some economic resources and discretionary capacities, 
although this means forgoing some future first-best options. Thus, renouncing individual discretion is 
empowering in the sense that extended exchanges become possible because of social pacification and 
the establishment of common rules that apply to a wide social spectrum. This is the underlying 
paradox of the contractual theory of the state: enfranchisement is founded on delegation and 
renouncing opportunities, yet it supports civic participation and enrichment. 
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As social integration and decentralized exchange increase, delegation becomes more difficult to 
design, negotiate (or renegotiate), and administer. A classic problem is how to prioritize competing 
preferences and simultaneously address the underlying issues of distributive justice. Condorcet and 
Arrow famously established that, in a pluralistic society, the nontransitivity of preferences requires 
that a “benevolent dictator” be given authority to rank priorities (i.e., to establish the “common 
interest”). In principle, regulating this power is a core element of the delegation contract, which should 
address all problems of contestability, accountability, and legitimacy.  
Safeguards against capture and extortion may take the canonical forms of parliamentary representation 
and reverse commitments entered into by the ruler (e.g., signing a Bill of Rights). Complementary 
options are mechanisms of checks and balances, such as a division of powers à la Montesquieu, a 
federal constitution, a meritocratic bureaucracy, or delegated regulation (as in the case of a central 
bank). Note, however, that this constitutional vocabulary should not be taken too literally. Delegation 
can be informal, it needs not emerge from a founding pact, and its evolution can be piecemeal, 
gradual, and uneventful. For instance, the “feudal constitutions” of medieval Europe were not 
summarized in a single coherent text, yet they created expectations regarding future behaviors and the 
sanctioning of wayward behaviors. 
The set of rights and public goods agreed to in the delegation contract is the main determinant of 
agents’ actual capacity to associate, contract, and compete. Standard examples include the right to sell 
land, establish corporations, create civil associations, and organize trade unions. Indeed, rights are 
empowering and—if sufficiently extensive and well enforced—may strongly affect the long-term 
dynamics of the division of labor, both social and economic. Hence, if the production of public goods 
is efficient and if constitutional commitments are credible, then the “policy content” of delegation may 
grow over time: the individual franchise will increase, more public goods will be offered, and welfare 
growth may follow. In the best cases, economic growth and adhesion to the social order may become 
mutually reinforcing. The hard game of a market economy and the extended reach of lawmakers 
would be legitimated by the huge collective benefits that result from a high-powered political 
compact. 
However, commitments and safeguards may be absent, or they may not actually bind rulers, or they 
may not be sustainable over time. Individuals in such circumstances may thus shirk or exit, or they 
may withdraw delegation or limit its scope. Hence, even though everyone would be better of with 
more rights and better policies, the transfer of resources and authority to the state will remain narrow 
and the consequences on welfare will be adverse. We label such political orders despotic, as opposed 
to liberal, and next we discuss these orders in more detail.13 Later we show how this opposition 
informs our understanding of the present world order and its possible evolution. 
 
3.2. Individual Rights and Societal Integration: Despotic versus Liberal Orders 
The defining characteristic of a despotic order is that inequality of rights is built in to the structure of 
the delegation contract. Hence there are systematic asymmetries in access to organizations, markets, 
and public goods as well as, more generally, to sources of income and influence.14 This state of affairs 
has powerful consequences. First, the despot has a limited capacity to commit himself vis-à-vis the 
broader population, as he will always be suspected of favoring some and/or trying to deceive others. 
Second, the scope of the common interest is narrow and, when a situation of competition arises, a 
winner-take-all pattern tends to dominate ex post with few if any rights for the losers, whether or not 
they are the majority.15 Third, absolute oppression is not the rule. Even when unequally distributed, 
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 This pattern is consistent the concept of a “natural state” as developed by North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009), where resources and 
rights may still be leveraged, individually or collectively. Individuals are born into social orders that 
are often asymmetric, unfair, and possibly oppressive; however, they may either stay put or opt out 
(albeit at varying costs), or they may organize and renegotiate political orders, create new ones, 
structure competition among them, and so forth. Individuals can even band together to make 
revolutions, sometimes successful ones. 
Take also the case the “informal sector” in today’s developing countries. People living in slums or in 
dispossessed rural areas are seldom entirely devoid of rights; instead, their rights tend to be poorly 
enforced and even then only locally. Micro-entrepreneurs, for example, can typically raise funds only 
from neighbors and parents, and their trading partners may be limited to their own area. Old-age or 
health protection may also be reserved to those working in the formal sector, or to those with a strong 
capacity to organize and lobby. Still, the outsiders y re not necessarily stuck; they may, for instance, 
be able to vote or learn to organize.16 
Nonetheless, a defining consequence of limited rights is that the marginalized masses are usually 
inclined to resist the despot’s attempts to coerce, raise revenue, and extend his normative capacities. 
Unless actually threatened by local rulers, the masses would rather have most of their basic rights and 
common goods provided locally—that is, by kin groups, ethnic communities, guilds, warlords, mafia 
bosses, party cliques, and the like. Rights are then contingent upon allegiance, favoritism, or personal 
reputation. In other words, they are both unequal vertically (between the core and periphery of society) 
and different horizontally (across local orders or communities). This pervasive form of normative 
fragmentation serves in part as a check against coercion and exploitation by a larger, more distant 
ruler. The result, however, is widespread unregulated legal pluralism and considerable obstacles to 
circulation, emancipation, and competition. Take ancien régime France as an example: the legal 
infrastructure took the form of coutumes, or local customary laws that had been progressively written 
and confirmed from the mid-fifteenth century onward. On the eve of the Revolution, there were 65 
coutumes générales and 300 other coutumes locales; all were enforced by the local courts and 
ultimately by the 15 provincial supreme courts, or Parlements. And this of course applied to a society 
that was still organized by status groups (the nobility, clergy, guilds, etc.).17 
Liberal orders, in contrast, are explicitly founded on the principle of equality of rights among citizens 
regardless of their social, geographical, professional, ethnic, or religious background—or their wealth. 
Of course, the scope of those equal and impersonal rights may vary widely across societies and over 
time. Eighteenth-century England, for instance, guaranteed roughly equal rights in civil and economic 
matters even though the country was governed by only about 25,000 people. Still, the primary benefit 
of equal and individual rights is to emancipate individuals from their local communities, or bosses, 
and allow them to associate, invest, and trade across a much broader social space. Because rights are 
equal on both sides of the fence, individuals may take on inefficient producers, entrenched local rulers, 
and rent-seeking coalitions. And because equal rights are a spectacular instrument for reducing 
transactions costs, citizens and merchants may then aggregate into larger, more competitive public 
arenas and markets. On the one hand, this results in economies of scale, technological diffusion, the 
benefits of specialization, and hence economic growth. On the other hand, a broader and more equal 
polity makes it easier for a governor to commit herself. She will not be expected (as a despot would 
be) to discriminate and deceive—not because she is necessarily more virtuous but because she is under 
credible checks. This leads in turn to greater willingness by citizens to delegate authority and 
resources, resulting in a wider common interest and possibly a better supply of public goods. Other 
things equal, liberal orders are typically associated with a more integrated civil society, a larger state, 
and a more dynamic economy than are despotic orders. 
At first sight, addressing the bipolar continuum between despotic and liberal orders may seem like an 
unnecessary detour in a discussion of states, individual rights, and “global governance”. Yet it offers a 
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number of analytical benefits that will now become more evident. First, it introduces an explicit 
ideational dimension: individuals are primarily motivated by material interest, but they are also able to 
identify and debate about the institutions to which they have entrusted their basic rights and common 
interest. Second, we are spared the costs of postulating some initial social contract, or a founding 
constitutional commitment, whose ulterior evolution or renegotiation would be difficult to imagine. In 
fact, we make no assumptions about the origin of society; we merely assume that individuals are born 
into a social order that leaves them some room for strategic interaction vis-à-vis given rules. Liberal 
and despotic institutions, like states and markets, are social constructs that can evolve endogenously or 
be reformed. 
 
3.3. The Dual Structure of Modern States 
Modern states, we proposed, revolve around two dimensions: government and the production of public 
goods; and the trusteeship of private rights and civil liberties. In fact, these two dimensions are also 
institutionalized in two distinct hierarchies, a government bureaucracy and a hierarchy of norms and 
jurisdictions—say, a legal order. 
The primary force behind the development of legal orders has been extensively discussed by classical 
sociology and economic history: the development of extended, impersonal relations and organizations 
leads to the increasing formalization of social norms and arrangements. For instance, formal property 
titles and written contracts allow courts to interpret and enforce them in a predictable way, even across 
large jurisdictions and over long period of time.18 However, under a liberal order, the downside of 
legalization and enfranchisement is that a multitude of agreements, regulations, bylaws, and local 
delegations or private orders created at all levels of social life may constitute new obstacles to free 
circulation. Political devolution and free enterprise increase the capacity of citizens to self-organize, 
but the latter may then threaten open access and contestability. 
The classical response is the development of a working hierarchy of norms and jurisdictions headed by 
a supreme court in charge of defending constitutional rights. In all liberal regimes, the legal order 
regulates, on a case-by-case basis, the balance between equality and autonomy. It should guarantee the 
freedom to contract and self-organize while preserving normative coherence, open access, and the 
integrity of both the body politic and the markets. Federal countries make this trade-off explicit, 
although other types of government also need to address it. France and Great Britain for instance have 
a much more centralized government structure than Germany or Italy. But basic rights and liberties in 
all four countries are all established at the highest level of political organization and ultimately 
enforced and defended downwards.19 
In contrast the government bureaucracy is concerned with commands, controls, tax collection, 
allocation of resources, and the organization of diverse production functions. Hence it mobilizes 
considerably more resources than the legal order and it is in many respects much harder to organize 
and manage. The legitimacy of each hierarchy is thus founded on different principles: the legal order 
relies on (at least the pretense of) neutrality, disinterestedness, and political nonalignment; whereas the 
legitimacy of government bureaucracies is based primarily on representation (e.g., parliamentary 
politics) and cost-effectiveness.  
The point, however, is that these two hierarchies need not remain as closely intertwined as they have 
been within the classical, European nation-state. For example, today’s European Union is regulated by 
an integrated hierarchy of courts while bureaucratic resources and executive power remain located, for 
the most part, at the national level. The EU Commission does not count for much in terms of financial 
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or staffing resources. Although this institutional setup is certainly not without tensions, there is no 
evidence that it is intrinsically flawed or doomed. In other words, the classic constitutional conjunction 
between the legal order and the government of public goods may not be necessary. It could be severed 
without endangering the liberal rule, in which case both hierarchies could be restructured—from the 
local to the global level—along different and independent lines. They might then better serve their 
intended goals: establishment of the realm of civil action by a trustee; and provision of public goods 
by government agents. We shall follow this broad line of argument in discussing how states may 
evolve and how sovereignty may be redefined under the pressures raised by globalization.  
 
4. Dynamics of World Ordering 
4.1. The Outside Boundaries of States and the International Order 
Indeed our discussion so far has unfolded within the framework of an implicitly closed society. Still, 
the legal orders and bureaucratic hierarchies have spatial borders that are certainly formalized. We 
define interstate cooperation as consisting of the transactions and transfers of resources and authority 
to organizations whereby governments regulate how their legal orders and bureaucracies (i) recognize 
the rights of nonresidents; and (ii) regulate the cross-border flows of goods, factors, people, and 
ideas.20 
Take the case of coordination between judiciaries. European governments in the nineteenth century 
and during the interwar period assumed that the authority to settle civil disputes was a core sovereign 
prerogative. Hence they established stringent conditions on confirming foreign judicial decisions, 
making cross-border cases a rather complicated affair. Today such cases have become considerably 
easier as a result of broader judicial comity, international arbitration, and the mutual quotation of 
judicial decisions. Obviously this makes things easier for merchants and vacationers among others. 
The same logic applies to international treaty making and the devolution of resources to IGOs. The 
overall effect is to facilitate international transactions and increase the provision of international public 
goods, i.e. to empower agents. And as they increase their overseas investment, exploit their 
comparative advantages, and absorb foreign technological progress, the economic division of labor 
expands along the lines opened by diplomats, experts and entrepreneurs in private ordering; hence 
integration increases. Ultimately, then, “treaty compliance” is not an issue of the will of a self-
contained sovereign actor; rather, it is primarily an issue of private interests that exploit rules or 
organizations to their advantage, just as they benefited from the rights for which they bargained 
domestically.21 Therefore, domestic delegations should be reinforced by more internationally agile 
governments that are keen to reduce transaction costs in private international exchanges.22 
For this reason, in the perspective defended here, signing on an international treaty—or transferring 
resources and prerogatives to IGOs—has little to do with sovereignty. Because sovereignty establishes 
the domestic political order, renouncing it should be primarily about how core individual rights are 
established and how the “Arrovian” definition of the common interest is negotiated and implemented. 
So when looking for a signal of a “sovereignty transfer”, one should not focus merely on budgetary 
contributions to particular IGOs, but first look at the authority to tax—and on this score, the ceding of 
sovereignty is exceedingly rare. The EU, for instance, features representation but not taxation. Another 
criterion is the authority to intervene ex post in matters involving private property rights, such as 
bankruptcy, eminent domain, and antitrust. This may seem like a narrow test, but it is not: under any 
liberal government, such actions are typically surrounded by exceptional judicial safeguards that 
should warrant motives and procedures to be free from arbitrariness. This institutional buildup reflects 
how, in practice, the liberal state protects and regulates the exercise of private rights and hence the 
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private–public interaction. To our knowledge, EU antitrust policy is the sole contemporary example of 
such concession to a supranational authority; Europe-wide bankruptcies, in contrast, are merely 
coordinated between national jurisdictions. 
 
4.2. The World We Live In: The Neodespotic Model 
A fairly conventional (albeit abridged) representation of the dilemma of global governance may start 
from the account of a now widely extended, international division of labor in all its dimensions 
(economic, civic, social, etc.). International trade and finance is the straightforward illustration, one 
that easily draws with it self-evident consequences regarding policy-making and regulation against 
global systemic risks. But the fall in the costs of communication and coordination also allow private 
political entrepreneurs to easily mobilize large numbers of individuals and organizations with shared 
preferences (e.g., all the stakeholders involved in a given industry or humanitarian cause). Such single-
issue organizations will typically put forward their efficiency-driven credentials and challenge states 
with respect to their special concerns. Of course, these groups have no obligation to prioritize 
competing interests or to implement broad rules of distributive justice, so their pretense of political 
efficiency is skewed at best. This is also why a world convention of single-issue militants could never 
establish a world polity: they may design coalitions, but they would not write covenants. 
The enforcement capacity of national governments is also affected by the capacity of a nonnegligible 
subset of the population to easily opt out of local regulatory orders and shop around internationally. 
Hence there is a strong incentive for the state to consider primarily these groups’ specific interests 
when public policy—in particular, fiscal policy—is designed. However, accommodating special 
interests in this fashion weakens a state’s capacity to guarantee last-resort regulation and to adjudicate 
against bypassing strategies. Quite clearly this renders more suspect the government’s claim to weigh 
fairly all preferences when establishing the “local common interest”. 
To this well-known line of argument our analytical framework adds a further consideration: the global 
arena is structured by specific rules, organizations, social movements, and so forth; but it is primarily 
populated by agents and governments who stem from a large cross section of more or less liberal or 
despotic regimes. And because both agents and governments are defined primarily by the rights and 
delegation that they have negotiated domestically, once on the international scene they are doomed to 
be unequal and different. In other words, what characterizes the international or global scene—
whether one looks at governance or the division of labor—is the strength of despotic patterns. 
Whereas until now we envisaged the despotic/ liberal opposition in a diachronic or dynamic 
perspective, we now rely on it in a synchronic or cross-country one, so as to help us describing the 
political structure of the present world.  
The neo-despotic character of today’s world is primarily reflected in a fractured, incomplete normative 
framework that is devoid of a working international hierarchy of norms. The logical consequences are 
not so different, ceteris paribus, from those suggested by our previous brief depiction of ancien régime 
France. First, there is not even an approximation to equal individual rights across countries. Neither is 
there any binding rule of interaction between public and private or between a notion of common good 
and special interests—be they the interests of individual states, single-issue militants, or private 
businesses. Indeed, there are few institutional checks against rent-seeking monopoly positions or 
strong-arm politics. Then, the circulation of persons, production factors, and goods encounters many 
obstacles and many global public goods are provided inefficiently and/or illegitimately. Finally, large 
segments of the world’s population tend to coalesce in (or be captured by) local orders, some of which 
embody the most threatening aspects of despotism. 
These neodespotic patterns may well evoke the neomedievalist regime envisaged by many scholars of 
IR and the state,23 a comparison that was indeed alluded to in the introduction. However, 
contemporary states are much more solidly established than trading cities of the past, and most 
individuals are probably much more emancipated economically and politically; hence the dynamics of 
collective action is and will remain much different from what is was in the distant past. Nonetheless, 
as we try to envisage how an international political reordering might play out, we must still look at 
how future burghers and merchants may negotiate with the princes and challenge them. 
 
4.3. Actors in World Politics: Citizens versus Elites 
Because a global political order would run counter to incumbent states, it would be opposed primarily 
by their political and technocratic elites. These elites control many existing regulatory institutions, 
they have a monopoly on decision making in IGOs and they share a vested interest in defending the 
prerogatives associated with being the recipients of strong delegations. Of course perks are a part of 
the story, though probably not a major one. More important should be the authority to enforce 
fundamental rights, to define the (national) common interest, broker redistributive arrangements 
between social groups, divide regulatory tasks between state and substate public regulators, etc.  
Yet these elites are not necessarily antiglobalization. Because they are political aggregators, they 
benefit from considerable room for strategic behavior as they envisage alternative solutions to global 
policy challenges. Divergences or bifurcations may emerge from this point and endure. For example, 
risk-averse governing elites may align themselves with antiglobalization clienteles and marginal 
producers so that they can jointly defend an existing redistributive compact. Indeed, a significant 
fraction of the population in many countries has little interest in expanded international competition, 
so they would surely resist any sovereignty transfer. Conversely, state elites may side with the forces 
of increased competition in order to spur economic growth and hence their own fiscal revenue – just 
like early modern, mercantilist kings. But in any case, elites would only relinquish sovereign 
prerogatives if immediately threatened with losing their delegation – they surely want to remain in 
control.  
At the leading edge of any movement toward global political reordering, militants are likely to be 
mobilized first by their material interests. That is, private agents will seek a more unified and stronger 
definition of property rights; reduced transaction costs; and a number of global market infrastructures, 
including economic stabilization and growth-supporting public infrastructure. Still, the civic-oriented 
demand for more equal rights is already vocal and will continue to find many advocates. These two 
classes of motives admittedly reflect different political sociologies. But there is no reason to assume 
they are necessarily exclusive, contrary to the textbook opposition between utilitarians and idealists. 
Recall the antidespotic demands for liberty and equality in 1776 America, 1789 France, 1848 
Germany, and 1981 Poland. The economic resources in these countries were not only badly managed. 
More unbearable was the inequality of rights and rewards between the privileged elites and the 
deprived masses. It then became critical to extend equal rights, open access and competition to both 
the public space and the marketplace, so that outcomes on both sides would be more legitimate and 
more efficient. The universal character of these civic principles explains why mobilization could 
subsume an extremely wide array of private (i.a. economic) interests even though all individuals 
would not benefit equally from an ulterior liberal reordering of society.  
On this basis, two factors should bear more on the future evolution of the global political order. First, 
ceteris paribus, the more civic interests dominate the debate, the more unitarian the eventual political 
order will be. In other words individual rights, economic and political, would become more unified 
across the world and the political institutions would be restructured in a more comprehensive way. 
Again, economic interests would necessarily be part of the very large coalition of interests that would 
agree or adhere to such endeavor. Yet the self-evident collective action problems that are implied here 
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may just not be solved, so that national elites may keep the lead. And as path-dependency dominates, 
national states would survive as strong entities and remain in charge of structuring the international 
order.  
Now these national compacts and their legal orders embody the core principles (or values, if you 
prefer) that structure social exchange and political institutions, in each country. This is the second, 
more structural factor that will bear on the dynamics of global re-ordering: more or less liberal 
(respectively despotic) polities will not envisage integration and right equalization similarly. 
Remember that despotic regimes are defined by unequal and different individual rights, and that they 
tend to resist open access and competition. Hence, one should not expect despotic governments to 
adhere to an international order that would commit them to adhere domestically to widely different 
premises (although their domestic, civic opposition may do). In other words: the more cross-border 
integration proceeds, the more it constraints domestic orders, and the more the despotic–liberal divide 
becomes salient. Whereas the present neodespotic regime can accommodate wide differences in this 
regard, a global federation would be exclusively liberal. Alternately, a principle of regionalization 
might arise whereby more liberal countries, with more equal rights domestically, would converge 
more easily among themselves than with the rest of the world. 
Table 1 shows how four scenarios can now be generated out of the answers given to two questions: 
first on the role for inter-state cooperation (including IGOs, etc.); second on the extent to which 
individual franchises remains exclusively national. Table 2 summarizes these model scenarios, of 
which only the federation reflects a full transfer of sovereignty to a global authority. It results from the 
capacity of political entrepreneurs to mobilize and coordinate a large array of interests and 
preferences, and then converge toward rules of global citizenship. In contrast, in a hegemonic world 
individual rights would remain grounded exclusively in national delegation compacts, and binding 
rules of interstate coordination would be expressly rejected. By way of comparison, enlightened 
despotism is characterized by a more rationalized, self-correcting, hence effective structure of 
interstate cooperation. Lastly, a confederation would see a large opening of national legal orders, so 
that private rights would be mutually recognized and enforced across borders, though without being 
unified.  
These models are ideal types in that they formalize a limited set of significant variables and relations. 
As such, they do not correspond to discrete classes of observable empirical experiences: patterns 
characteristic of different types may coexist in reality, as for example in the present-day EU. 
Furthermore, we are deliberately noncommittal regarding the dynamics of actual regimes: political 
orders evolve in an open-ended and historically indeterminate way, where intentionality is bounded by 
collective action problems and by the structure of existing sovereign delegations.  
 
5. Scenarios for the Emergence of a Future World Order 
5.1. The Hegemon 
What happens if entrenched national elites do not promote efficiency and fail to accommodate equity-
driven demands for political reform? Or if states are unable to enter constructive strategies of 
international reordering? The answer is that the base—merchants and citizens—will take the lead. The 
easiest road is then to converge individually toward a more satisfactory regulatory order. In other 
words, people would opt out of their domestic order and place themselves under the protection of a 
more efficient sovereign. Emigration and diasporas are standard examples; others include fiscal 
evasion, capital flight, and education in foreign colleges. Alternatively, agents might lobby their home 
authorities to adjust local norms and rules to a benchmark model so that coordination becomes easier 
and transaction costs smaller. For instance, “dollarization” allows for both the decentralized, 
spontaneous approach and the official, formal one. Another example is the worldwide adoption of 
European norms for the environment and consumer security. 
Because this scenario is driven by the capacity of individuals to raise credible threats of exit, 
institution building and collective action face considerable obstacles. For one, the “supply” of rules 
comes from a primus inter pares state whose regulations are voluntarily adopted by outsiders without 
any discussion or bargaining. Delegation to the hegemonic state occurs de facto rather than de jure; it 
is typically informal and gradual rather than explicit and democratically agreed upon. It also raises 
immediate problems concerning safeguards: foreign citizens are not represented in the checks and 
balances or in the policy-making system of the hegemon, although they may still prefer such “junior” 
citizenship to what their own national state offers. 
One variant of this scenario may see economic and political elites opting out of a given country 
en masse, thereby compromising the state’s capacity to support efficient bureaucracies, a working 
legal order, and economic growth. This trajectory might converge asymptotically toward a world order 
in which a few hegemons are surrounded by failed states. In that case, inequality in rights and in 
access to public goods would be maximized across nations while the overall capacity to agree on the 
production of common goods would be minimized. International protectorates or notions of “shared 
sovereignty” would be markers of such trends24 and, as argued by Hobbes, state coalitions would 
primarily aim to maintain their advantage over other coalitions. 
But the hegemonic model may also be consistent with a progressive convergence of national polities 
toward liberal principles, albeit with limited institutionalization of interstate relations. The 
conventional representation of the nineteenth-century European Concert of Nations is a good example: 
national governments defended a compact definition of sovereignty, domestic rules were little 
constrained by interstate relations, asymmetries of power were played out in the open, and dispute 
resolution typically followed the nonbinding rules of “arbitration under anarchy” (which address only 
coordination problems, not problems of cooperation).25 Still, governments supported extended 
economic exchanges and the free circulation of persons, so that economic competition and emulation 
could bring about substantial formal convergence: “norm cascades” for instance can be part of such 
international order.26 It however is important to note that the Concert was also consistent with wide 
disparities regarding the character of domestic delegations contracts: there was indeed no question that 
Russian despotism, German militarism, and the successive political experiments in France in some 
way limited the capacity of the respective governments to join in. 
Compared with the hegemonic model, the three next scenarios are more supportive of global 
integration and imply a much more consistent integration in matters of rights, norms, and the structure 
of legal orders.27 
 
5.2. Enlightened Despotism 
Under a scenario of enlightened despotism, the national governing elites succeed in maintaining their 
control over the international regulatory architecture while meeting many of the demands of private 
agents through a fairly rationalized, stable set of IGOs and treaties. Specifically, two patterns would 
come to the fore. 
First, an enlightened despotic scenario would feature a rebalancing of international delegation from the 
classical multilateral model founded on agency to an increased reliance upon trustees. As defined by 
Alter (2006, 2008a, 2008b),28 trustees receive a mandate to regulate a well-delineated set of relations; 
however, they are not under direct and explicit control as agents would be under a principal. Trustees 
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are typically chosen for their personal competence and authority, placed under specific rules of 
accountability, and expected to act on the basis of their personal judgment in an independent, 
apolitical manner. Examples include central bankers, judges, and representatives of epistemic 
communities. As a consequence of their mandate, trustees will advertise their dissents with the 
politicians who nominated them because doing so increases trustee credibility. A traditional agent does 
not behave in this way. 
Indeed, the most remarkable shift vis-à-vis the traditional principal–agent framework is that a trustee 
does not serve the interests of those who chose her but rather the interests of third parties, those who 
are at the receiving end of monetary policy or dispute resolution, for example. She therefore 
constitutes a collective interest in the service she delivers and also delineates “a public”, who may 
become interested in entering a specific discursive interaction with her. Thus may emerge an 
embryonic notion of parallel delegation to this supranational entity—or, say, some form of recognition 
or implicit confirmation by third parties. In an admittedly fragmented way, a public–private rule of 
interaction may then take shape between regulator and the emerging public. 
This trend is consonant more generally with the second trend: the increasing capacity of international 
organizations to evolve, self-adjust, and resolve bilateral disputes—for example, via developing 
international administrative law, formal rules of review to monitor state compliance, peer pressure, 
and so forth. The mutual recognition and quotation of decisions rendered in different organizations 
typically help them coordinate on stable though informal rules of interaction. In such an environment, 
the concepts of tipping points, coordination focus and generic expertise accumulated in organizations 
have their greatest influence.29 
Yet compliance is never fully guaranteed, and governments may always opt in and out of 
arrangements depending on their short-term cost–benefit trade-offs. This pattern is of critical 
importance on the frontier of international policy making—where rules and regulatory trade-offs are 
not settled and stalemate is a constant threat. The World Trade Organization is a straightforward 
example: thanks inter allia to the dispute settlement mechanism, past settlements are generally 
enforced and adjustable at the margins; however, any extension of free trade to new domains 
immediately brings out the “realist” interaction of national interests (as occurs when the liberalization 
of services or agricultural trade is proposed). 
Finally, public opinion and international civic organizations remain outside the conference buildings. 
Intergovernmental organizations may hold press conferences, maintain rich websites, and meet with 
representatives of associations, but in no case do these outsiders actually participate in the formal 
decision making. Hence these more competent and better coordinated IGOs would not help 
establishing an integrated international public domain—nor a corresponding international civil 
society—in either the liberal or Gramscian sense. More generally, this evolution would support 
international policy-making and offer a more supportive environment to agents, though without 
affecting their core individual rights – they would indeed remain anchored in national delegation 
compacts.  
This marks the exact limit beyond which this scenario would not extend. It is in fact the counterparty 
to the broad participation of most states in these agreements and assemblies, howsoever despotic their 
character. The Chinese and Russian governments, to mention just two examples, are not much 
concerned with the demands of (mostly Western) civic militants; but they would not admit that their 
own citizens may leverage internationally agreed-upon rules or rights on the domestic scene—
specifically, the political one. For this reason, most despotic states, which are often willing to abide by 
common regulatory norms in the economic field, nevertheless maintain a strong hold on just how 
enlightened the contemporary neodespotic international order may become. This level of control is 
ultimately reflected in the rather narrow legitimacy principle that underpins this scenario—namely, 
accountability. 
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 5.3. The Confederation 
The confederation represents the most direct evolution into a more settled, intergovernmental regime 
although it would require that individual rights are substantially though indirectly affected. Much 
stronger mutual guarantees than in the previous ideal types are built in regarding compliance, formal 
integration, and especially private rights. Hence the potential impact on the international division of 
labor is substantial although ultimate delegation of sovereignty and definition of basic rights remain at 
the national level. Indeed, the confederative model is a project driven by the elites, and because citizen 
consent is solicited ex post rather than ex ante, decision makers can easily design arrangements that 
accommodate their vested interests. 
Beyond, the first main feature of a confederation is that IGOs in charge of producing the most 
important public goods (e.g., climate, trade, food security, health) increasingly take a 
constitutionalized form. In particular, the definition, adjudication, and enforcement of norms (i.e., the 
three Montesquieu powers) tend to be delegated to separate but mutually controlled bodies. This 
institutional architecture is thus more comprehensive than that of the previous cases, which were 
characterized by straightforward agency and trusteeship. In this case, the division of authority and the 
procedural safeguards are much more sophisticated and binding: governments want to have more 
guarantees from IGOs, although these mechanisms protect as well private interests against abuse.  
Second is the increased opening of national legal orders—that is, the mutual recognition of private 
rights and court judgments. Although states remain the ultimate guarantors of their respective legal 
orders, they also recognize the rules of justice applied by others and enforce them with minimal 
scrutiny.30 This is hardly a new trend: protections granted to foreign merchants are as old as long-
distance trade; and, as stated before, the present rules are generally much more liberal than those in 
effect before World War II—especially within Europe, where integration of the national judicial 
orders is a key element of the Single market. This trend, whether evidenced in Europe or beyond, is 
visibly constrained by adhesion of member-states to a stronger concept of a community of rights: one 
that encompasses operations of the rule of law between private agents. Citizens should indeed 
acknowledge and accept that they could be directly affected by court judgments made abroad and 
under a legal order that differs from their own. This would be the conditions for much easier 
communication and transactions across borders.  
 
5.4. The Federation 
If the elites fail to establish an enlightened despotic regime or an elite-protecting confederation, then 
citizens and merchants may take the initiative. At this point, if they reject the go-it-alone option of exit 
then they might attempt to gain direct control of the global public sphere and to negotiate a new 
sovereign delegation. Unlike the previous scenarios, in which advocates for change mainly targeted 
transaction costs, in a federal scenario any concerns about efficiency or profits would be subsumed by 
the more universal principles of common good and equal rights. Such an outcome could transpire as a 
citizen’s uprising, where affirmation of the principles of equality and liberty galvanizes action and 
leads to the tearing down of an unjust and inefficient order. In Weber’s terms, the leitmotif of 
mobilization would be the “substantial” irrationality of the old order rather its “formal” irrationality, 
which dominates in the two previous models. 
Because the resulting federation would include all individuals, its main feature would be its universal 
egalitarian character: basic rights of citizenships, property rights, and open access would be globally 
established so that all levels of governments (municipal, provincial, national) would have to abide by 
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them. As a result, no legal or jurisdictional obstacles would remain to hinder the free circulation of 
individuals, social movements, ideas, or property. Enfranchisement—and thus the capacity to contest 
economic competitors and rulers—would then be maximal. Social and economic exchange could 
extend within a single civil realm; in this event, the present-day anarchic international order would be 
abolished, as it would within any nations that would adhere to such a federation. 
The second remarkable feature of this scenario is its disentanglement of bureaucracies and the legal 
order—and hence the end of states as historically contingent entities. Indeed, a world federal order 
need not merge national states into some “global state”; it would more likely signal the emergence of 
an original and more promising political order.31 On the one hand, the hierarchy of norms would be 
established globally, so that the realm of civic and economic action would be at last fully unified. On 
the other hand, this global jurisdiction would be instrumental in reallocating the provision of public 
goods among levels of government; equal rights also reduce transaction costs among bureaucracies. 
Therefore, collective preferences and efficiency concerns (economies of scope and scale) would at last 
structure the division of labor among them: considerable political decentralization may (or may not) 
eventually be observed, as national states would lose their stranglehold on a mass of public policies.32 
For instance, social security systems may properly remain associated with national communities 
whereas monetary policy might be structured in terms of optimal currency areas, and local 
jurisdictions would likewise apply to groundwater basins and school management.33 
The overall result is that sovereignty as a trusteeship of rights would be global and unified, whereas 
sovereignty as government or agency would be distributed among different levels of political ordering. 
Depending upon the extent of their respective delegation, local governments would establish their 
legitimacy on four principles of increasing importance: efficiency, accountability, fairness, and 
representation—with the last being required for taxation. Finally, citizenship would no longer be 
concentrated in a single political delegation. Equal basic rights would indeed establish the notion of a 
shared global citizenship. But solidarity and the government of local commonalities may also 
perpetuate a sense of affiliation or allegiance. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
This article offers a framework for analyzing the long-term evolution of political and economic orders 
in terms of delegation received from or withdrawn by individual agents. Enfranchisement derives from 
what and how agents agree to delegate, hence by their limited capacity to negotiate binding 
agreements with rulers. This agent-based, incentive-compatible approach then shapes a core 
interaction between the ongoing, long-run bargain on rights and the independent dynamics of the 
social division of labor—say, civil society and markets. The distribution of rights (i.e. their being more 
or less equally distributed) then helps to account for different long term patterns of development in 
both the states and the economies.  
Today however many agents have obtained a huge individual franchise that allows them to trade and 
organize far beyond the borders of their national state. The consequence is that governments are not 
only challenged domestically. It has also become more and more difficult for them to address the new 
interests and preferences that emerge from this sprawling, international division of labor. The 
international scene is indeed badly managed, its normative infrastructure is fractured, and the 
distribution of individual rights is hugely unequal. These facts justify its characterization as 
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neodespotic as well as its potential for contestation, reform, or rebuilding. From this account, we 
derive four long-term scenarios of political reordering, one of which (the “federal” scenario) would 
entail disappearance of the classical nation-state built on the conjunction of a legal order and a 
government bureaucracy. 
However, two broad questions have not been addressed even though they clearly hang over this 
discussion. First, our framework assumes that the potential for a comprehensive evolution of the 
global political order would be bounded by the persistence of despotic national regimes. In other 
words: we modestly and parsimoniously concur with Rousseau and Kant, who argued that a 
community of states would be built by republics only. An open and indeed classical question is 
whether international exchanges and cooperation may, over time, affect the domestic bargain between 
rulers and citizens and then possibly feed back again internationally. For example, an internal 
dynamics of judicialization and liberalization may take hold in despotic countries and progressively 
change the rules the game. Alternately despotic states may socialize constructively and negotiate trade 
agreements without ever losing control over the domestic rules of the game (i.e., their legal order). In 
fact our response to this alternative is very simple – we just don’t know.  
 
The second question is suggested by the international financial crisis that began in 2007. A mass of 
private agents had been endowed with exceptionally large rights to invest and speculate worldwide. 
They then accumulated globally unsustainable stocks of financial assets whose collapse called for 
massive intervention by national regulators: lenders of last resort, bankruptcy courts, and national 
budgets. These events indicate that the time lag between an expanding, private-led division of labor 
and the slow-moving process of international political reordering may not be manageable. Markets, in 
other words, would be doomed to overextend and then retrench without ever allowing for supportive 
global rules and policies to be put in place. Cycles of great reversals would then rule, although within 
inherited state borders.34 
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 Table 1. Four Global Scenarios  
 
Interstate cooperation  
disappears 
 
Interstate cooperation 
structures the international 
order 
Individual franchises are affected 
by the international order 
Federation Confederation 
Individual franchises are only 
national 
Hegemony Enlightened despotism 
 
 Table 2. Four Ideal Types of International Order 
 
 Political model 
 
Hegemon Enlightened 
despotism 
Confederation Federation 
Keeper of delegation Dominant national 
states 
National states National states 
International order Anarchy without 
institutions 
Society of states Cosmopolitan 
democracy 
Global federation 
Compliance Asymmetric 
coordination 
Coordination and 
multilateral 
cooperation 
National courts as 
international enforcers 
Constitutional 
International 
judicial orders 
Arbitration under 
anarchy, domestic 
international law 
Ad hoc courts and 
trustees, case-based 
lawmaking 
Ad hoc sectional 
constitutionalization, 
administrative review 
Domestic legal 
orders 
Self-contained and 
asymmetric 
Self-contained Mutual recognition of 
national legal orders 
 
Integrated judicial 
order under a supreme 
court 
 
Rule of legitimacy Private efficiency Accountability Fairness Representation 
Present policy model Dollarization, 
voluntary recognition 
of norms 
EU trade policy Schengen rules, 
acquis 
communautaire 
EU antitrust 
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